MILITARY THOUGHT No. 4/2000 Pg. 30-33

Federal Intelligence and Control System airspace: improvement problems

Lieutenant General A.V. SHRAMCHENKO

Colonel V.P. SAUSHKIN, candidate of military sciences

an IMPORTANT component of ensuring national security Russian Federation and air traffic safety over the country's territory are radar reconnaissance and airspace control. The key role in solving this problem belongs to the radar facilities and systems of the Ministry of Defense and the Federal Air Transport Service (FSVT).

At the present stage, when issues of rational use of material and financial resources allocated for defense, conservation of weapons resources and military equipment, the main direction in the development of radar facilities and systems should be considered not the creation of new ones, but the organization of a more efficient integrated use of existing ones. This circumstance predetermined the need to concentrate the efforts of various departments on the integration of radar facilities and systems into the Unified Automated Radar System (EARLS) within the framework of the Federal System for Reconnaissance and Airspace Control (FSR and KVP) of the Russian Federation.

Developed in accordance with the Decree of the President of Russia, the federal target program for improving the FSR and CVP for 2000-2010 proclaims its goal to achieve the required efficiency and quality of solving the problems of air defense, protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, radar support for aviation flights and air traffic management at the most important air directions based on the integrated use of radar facilities and systems of the types of the RF Armed Forces and the Federal Air Transport Service in the context of a reduction in the total composition of forces, means and resources.

The main task of the first stage of improving the FSR and CVP (2000-2005) was the creation of EARLS in the Central and North Caucasian air defense zones, in the Kaliningrad air defense region (Baltic Fleet), in certain areas of the North-Western and Eastern air defense zones on the basis of complex equipment of groups troops and positions of the FSVT with unified means of automation of interspecific use.

For this, it is planned, first of all, to develop concepts for the development of radar detection equipment to equip the EARLS and a unified system for displaying the underwater, surface and air situation in maritime theaters. Particular attention will be paid to the system engineering issues of building a real-time information exchange system for FSR and KVP on the basis of existing and prospective means.

During this period, it is necessary to master the mass production of radar equipment that has passed state tests, unified complexes of automation equipment (KSA) for interspecific use in stationary and mobile versions, and to begin systematic equipping of groupings of troops with them in accordance with the strategy for creating the EARLS. In addition, it is necessary to determine the composition, organizational structure and armament of the mobile reserve of the FSR and KBIT of constant readiness, as well as the list of radio engineering units of the coastal surveillance service of the Navy for inclusion in the FSR and KVP, develop proposals and plans for their phased rearmament. It is necessary to carry out measures to modernize radio-electronic equipment, extend its service life and maintain the existing fleet in good condition, R&D aimed at creating priority promising models of interspecific application, develop norms (standards and recommendations) for basic equipment options for units of the Ministry of Defense and positions of the dual-use FS VT, in according to which they were retrofitted.

The result of the work should be the testing of experimental sections of EARLS fragments, their retrofitting with unified information exchange complexes, and the dissemination of the experience gained to other air defense zones and regions.

At the second stage(2006-2010) it is planned to complete the formation of EARLS in the North-Western and Eastern air defense zones; creation of EARLS fragments in certain areas of the Ural and Siberian air defense zones; creation of a mobile reserve of FSR and KVP of constant readiness, its equipping with mobile radars and KSA of interspecific use; completion of R&D on the development of priority promising models of radio-electronic equipment for interspecific use and the beginning of the systematic equipping of the FSR and KVP with them; completion of building an information exchange system for the FSR and KVP as a whole; carrying out research and development on the development of unified block-modular radars and KSA of interspecific application; creation of a scientific and technical reserve for further development and improvement of the SRF and KVP.

It should be noted that the strict departmental subordination of the radar equipment of the types of the RF Armed Forces and the Federal Military Service, in combination with the low level of automation of the processes of controlling the forces and means of radar reconnaissance, makes it difficult to build the FSR and KVP according to a single plan and plan, and especially the adoption of optimal decisions on its use in the interests of all consumers of radar information. Thus, indicators of the effectiveness of the use of FSR and KVP in solving functional problems, regularities and principles of management, powers and limits of responsibility of command and control bodies for managing the forces and means of radar reconnaissance in peacetime, during combat duty and in the process of combat use, have not been determined.

The complexity of identifying the patterns and principles of managing the FSR and CVP is due to insufficient experience in its use. It is required to create an appropriate terminology with the choice of the most accurate definitions of the basic concepts related to radar. Nevertheless, certain views have developed on the principles of managing complex organizational and technical systems, the organization and methods of work of management bodies, taking into account the prospects for the development and implementation of automated control systems. A wealth of experience has been accumulated in solving the problems of controlling radar facilities and systems in the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Federal Military Service.

In our opinion, the management of the FSR and KVP should be a set of coordinated measures and actions of the management bodies of the FSR and KVP to maintain subordinate forces and means in constant readiness for their use and guide them in the performance of their tasks. It should be carried out taking into account the requirements of all interested parties on the basis of automation of the processes of collecting, processing and distributing information at all levels.

Studies have shown that, first, only central planning and control forces and means FSR And STOL will allow, at a given level of efficiency, to preserve the reserve of the technical resource of radio-electronic equipment to the maximum, reduce the number of maintenance personnel, create a unified system of operation, repair and logistics, and significantly reduce operating costs; Secondly, organizational structure and methods of management should be those in which the possibilities of technical means are used to the maximum extent to achieve the goals of management; thirdly, only complex automation of management processes And use of optimization models allow to achieve a significant increase in the efficiency of the application FSR And STOL compared to traditional heuristic methods of planning and management.

The main principles of the management of the SRF and KVP, in our opinion, should be centralization and unity of command. Indeed, the dynamism and transience of changes in the air and electronic situation, especially in the conditions of warfare, have significantly increased the role of the time factor and the need sole decision making and firmly putting it into practice. And this can be achieved only with a strict centralization of rights in the hands of one person. The centralization of control will allow in a short time and in the best way to coordinate the actions of heterogeneous forces and means FSR and CVP, apply them effectively, quickly concentrate efforts on the main directions, on the solution of the main tasks. At the same time, centralized management should be combined with the provision of initiative to subordinates in determining how to perform the tasks assigned to them.

The need for unity of command and centralization of management also follows from the very goals of creating FSR and KVP, which are the reduction in the total costs of the Ministry of Defense and FSVT for holding R&D for the development of automation and radar equipment, for the maintenance and development of positions of radar facilities; unified understanding of the air situation in the control bodies of all levels; ensuring radio-electronic compatibility of means of radar and communication of types RF Armed Forces and FSVT in joint basing areas; reduction in the type and unification of radar facilities, KSA and communications facilities, the creation of uniform standards for their interface.

Since the foundation FSR And STOL make up the radio engineering troops Air Force, general management creation and the use of FSR and KVP, it is advisable to assign to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, who, as chairman of the Central Interdepartmental Commission FSR And STOL can administer FSR And KVP. The tasks of the commission should include: development of development plans FSR And STOL and coordination of R&D in this area, taking into account the main directions for improving the forces and means of radar reconnaissance of types RF Armed Forces and FSVT; implementation of a unified technical policy with the phased creation FSR And STOL, development of proposals and recommendations to the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Federal Service for Military Transport in the areas of development of radar, automation and communications, their standardization and compatibility; development of programs and plans for equipping the FSR and KVP with technical means that provide a high-quality solution to peacetime and wartime tasks, organizing work on certification, attestation and licensing of technical means; harmonization with the branches of the Armed Forces and the FSMFT of the normative and legal documents being developed that regulate the functioning of the FSR and the CVP; coordinated planning and formation of orders for serial production, purchase of new equipment for the FSR and KVP and its deployment; planning and organization of the use of FSR and KVP in the interests of all interested consumers of radar information; coordination with the branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the FSVT of issues related to the deployment and redeployment of radar units.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force can exercise direct control over the creation and improvement of the FSR and CVP through the Air Force Radio Engineering Troops Directorate, which performs the functions of the apparatus of the Central Interdepartmental Commission.

General guidance on the use of SRF and KVP in air defense zones it is advisable to lay on the commanders of the Air Force formations, in air defense areas - on commanders of air defense formations, who can manage the FSR and KVP personally, through the zonal interdepartmental commissions of the FSR and KVP, the headquarters of the Air Force formations and air defense formations, as well as through their deputies and chiefs of the radio engineering troops.

The tasks of the zonal interdepartmental commission of the FSR and KVP, the headquarters of the Air Force formation (air defense formations) should include: planning and organizing combat duty of a part of the forces and means of the FSR and KVP in the air defense zone (region); coordination of plans for the use of FSR and KVP in the air defense zone (area) with all interested departments; organizing and conducting training of personnel and equipment of the FSR and KVP for the fulfillment of assigned tasks; organization of radar reconnaissance and airspace control of the FSR and KVP in the air defense zone (area); control over the quality and stability of the provision of radar information to the authorities; organization of interaction with the forces and means of reconnaissance and airspace control, which are not part of the FSR and STOL; coordination of the issues of operation of technical means of the FSR and KVP.

Structurally, the control system of the FSR and KVP should include controls, control posts, a communication system, complexes of automation equipment, etc. In our opinion, it can be based on the control system of the radio engineering troops of the Air Force.

Immediate control it is expedient to produce by forces and means of radar reconnaissance and airspace control from the existing command posts of the services of the Armed Forces and the Federal Air Transport Service (according to departmental affiliation). At the same time, they must organize their work and the work of subordinate forces and means in accordance with the requirements of consumers of radar information on the basis of a unified planning for the use of FSR and KVP in zones and areas air defense.

In the course of combat use, the radio engineering units (radar positions) of the FSR and the KVP on issues of conducting radar reconnaissance and issuing radar information should be promptly subordinate to the command and control bodies of the radio engineering troops of the Air Force through the command posts of the corresponding branches of the Armed Forces.

In the context of the ever-increasing dynamism of the air and electronic situation and the active influence of the opposing side on radar facilities and systems, the requirements for ensuring their effective control are sharply increasing. It is possible to radically solve the problem of increasing the efficiency of the use of FSR and KVP only through complex automation of management processes based on the implementation new information technologies. A clear formulation of the goals of the functioning of the FSR and KVP, management tasks, the definition of target functions, the development of models adequate to the objects of management - these are the main problems that need to be solved when synthesizing the structure of the management system and algorithms for its functioning, distributing functions by levels of the management system and determining their optimal composition.

military thought. 1999. No. 6. S. 20-21.

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I reported to the President that the Aerospace Forces, in accordance with the program for rearmament of the army and navy, adopted in 2012, have already received 74 new radar stations. This is a lot, and at first glance, the state of radar reconnaissance of the country's airspace looks good. However, serious unresolved problems remain in this area in Russia.

Effective radar reconnaissance and airspace control are indispensable conditions for ensuring the military security of any country and the safety of air traffic in the sky above it.

In Russia, the solution to this problem is entrusted to the radar of the Ministry of Defense and.

Until the early 1990s, the systems of military and civilian departments developed independently and practically self-sufficiently, which required serious financial, material and other resources.

However, the conditions for airspace control became more and more complicated due to the increasing intensity of flights, especially by foreign airlines and small aircraft, as well as due to the introduction of a notification procedure for the use of airspace and the low level of equipping civil aviation with transponders of the unified state radar identification system.

The control over flights in the “lower” airspace (zone G according to the international classification), including over megacities and especially in the Moscow zone, has become more complicated. At the same time, the activities of terrorist organizations that are capable of organizing terrorist attacks using aircraft have intensified.

The appearance of qualitatively new means of observation also has an impact on the airspace control system: new dual-purpose radars, over-the-horizon radars and automatic dependent surveillance (ADS), when, in addition to secondary radar information, parameters are transmitted directly from the aircraft’s navigation instruments from the aircraft under observation, and etc.

In order to streamline all available surveillance equipment, in 1994 it was decided to create a unified system of radar facilities of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport within the framework of the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The first regulatory document that laid the foundation for the creation of the FSR and KVP was the corresponding decree of 1994.

According to the document, it was an interagency dual-use system. The purpose of creating the FSR and KVP was declared to be the unification of the efforts of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport to effectively solve the problems of air defense and traffic control in Russian airspace.

As work progressed to create such a system from 1994 to 2006, three more presidential decrees and several government decrees were issued. This period of time was spent mainly on the creation of regulatory legal documents on the principles for the coordinated use of civil and military radars (Ministry of Defense and Rosaviatsia).

From 2007 to 2015, work on the FSR and KVP was carried out through the State Armaments Program and a separate federal target program (FTP) "Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007-2015)". The head executor of work on the implementation of the FTP was approved. According to experts, the amount of funds allocated for this was at the level of the minimum allowable, but work has finally begun.

State support made it possible to overcome the negative trends of the 1990s and early 2000s to reduce radar field countries and create several fragments of a unified automated radar system (ERLS).

Until 2015, the area of ​​airspace controlled by the Russian Armed Forces was growing steadily, while the required level of air traffic safety was maintained.

All the main activities provided for by the FTP were carried out within the established indicators, but it did not provide for the completion of work on the creation of a unified radar system (ERLS). Such a system of reconnaissance and airspace control was deployed only in certain parts of Russia.

At the initiative of the Ministry of Defense and with the support of the Federal Air Transport Agency, proposals were developed to continue the actions of the program that had been launched, but not completed, in order to fully deploy a unified system of intelligence control and airspace control over the entire territory of the country.

At the same time, the "Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2016 and beyond", approved by the President of Russia on April 5, 2006, provides for the full-scale deployment of a unified federal system by the end of last year.

However, the corresponding FTP ended in 2015. Therefore, back in 2013, following the results of a meeting on the implementation of the State Armament Program for 2011-2020, the President of Russia instructed the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, together with and to submit proposals for amending the Federal Target Program “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007- 2015)" with the extension of this program until 2020.

The corresponding proposals were to be ready by November 2013, but Vladimir Putin's order was never fulfilled, and work to improve the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control has not been funded since 2015.

The previously adopted FTP has expired, and the new one has not yet been approved.

Previously, the coordination of relevant work between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission on the Use and Control of Airspace, formed by presidential decree, which was abolished back in 2012. After the liquidation of this body, there was simply no one to analyze and develop the necessary legal framework.

Moreover, in 2015, the position of general designer was no longer in the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control. The coordination of the bodies of the SDF and the CVP at the state level has actually ceased.

At the same time, competent experts now recognize the need to improve this system by creating a promising integrated dual-purpose radar (IRLS DN) and combining the FSR and KVP with an aerospace attack reconnaissance and warning system.

The new dual-use system should have, first of all, the advantages of a single information space, and this is possible only on the basis of solving many technical and technological problems.

The need for such measures is also evidenced by the complication of the military-political situation, and the increased threats from aerospace in modern warfare, which have already led to the creation of a new branch of the armed forces - Aerospace.

In the aerospace defense system, the requirements for the FSR and KVP will only grow.

Among them is the provision of effective continuous control in the airspace of the state border along its entire length, especially in the likely directions of attack by means of aerospace attack - in the Arctic and in the southern direction, including the Crimean peninsula.

This necessarily requires new funding for the FSR and KVP through the relevant federal target program or in another form, the re-establishment of a coordinating body between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, as well as the approval of new policy documents, for example, until 2030.

Moreover, if earlier the main efforts were aimed at solving the problems of airspace control in peacetime, then in the coming period, the tasks of warning about an air attack and information support for combat operations to repel missile and air strikes will become a priority.

- military observer of Gazeta.Ru, retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Academy of Air Defense (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior officer of the main headquarters of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy (1998).
Browser "" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).

Reliable Aerospace Defense (VKO) of the country is impossible without the creation of an effective system of reconnaissance and airspace control. An important place in it is occupied by a low-altitude location. The reduction of units and means of radar reconnaissance has led to the fact that over the territory of the Russian Federation today there are open sections of the state border and the country's interior. JSC NPP Kant, which is part of the Russian Technologies State Corporation, is conducting research and development to create a prototype of a multi-position spaced radar system for semi-active location in the radiation field of cellular communication systems, broadcasting and television, ground-based and space-based (the Rubezh complex).

Today, the greatly increased accuracy of targeting weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (AOS), and the tightened requirements for electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules, do not allow in peacetime to “contaminate” the populated areas of the country with the use of microwave radiation (UHF radiation) high-potential radar stations (RLS). In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population" dated March 30, 1999 No. 52-FZ, radiation standards have been established that are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars many times exceeds these standards. The problem is aggravated by the high probability of using low-flying low-observable targets, which requires the compaction of the combat formations of the traditional fleet radars and the increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (SVRLP). To create a continuous duty round-the-clock MSRLP with a height of 25 meters (the flight altitude of a cruise missile or an ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, only the cost of maintaining this section of the MSRLP will be at least three million rubles a year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities in the conditions of active use of electronic countermeasures (REW) by the enemy, traditional location means on duty can be largely suppressed, since the transmitting part of the radar completely unmasks its location.

It is possible to save the expensive resource of the radar station, increase their capabilities in peacetime and wartime, and also increase the noise immunity of the MSRLP by using semi-active location systems with an external illumination source.

For detection of air and space targets

Abroad, extensive research is being carried out on the use of third-party radiation sources in semi-active location systems. Passive radar systems that analyze TV broadcast (terrestrial and satellite), FM radio and cellular telephony, and HF radio signals reflected from targets have become one of the most popular and promising areas of study over the past 20 years. It is believed that the American corporation Lockheed Martin has achieved the greatest success here with its Silent Sentry system (“Quiet sentry”).

Own versions of passive radars are being developed by Avtec Systems, Dynetics, Cassidian, Roke Manor Research, and the French space agency ONERA. Active work on this topic is underway in China, Australia, Italy, and the UK.

The Hidden "Frontier" of Air Control

Similar work to detect targets in the field of illumination of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA PVO) named after Govorov. However, the weighty practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago on the use of illumination of analog radiation sources for solving problems of semi-active location turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communication technologies, the possibility of using semi-active location systems with external illumination has also appeared in Russia.

The complex of multi-position spaced radar system of semi-active location "Rubezh", being developed by JSC NPP Kant, is designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. Such a field of illumination is distinguished by the cost-effectiveness of airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The presence of a large number of highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communications) both in space and on Earth, which form continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detecting various types of targets. In this case, it is not required to spend money on radiation of own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multi-channel receiving modules (PM) spaced apart on the ground are used, which, together with radiation sources, create a semi-active location complex. The passive mode of operation of the Rubezh complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these funds and use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of masking coefficient is at least 1.5–2 times higher than a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

The use of more cost-effective means of locating the standby mode will significantly save the resource of expensive combat systems by saving the established resource spending limit. In addition to the standby mode, the proposed complex can also perform tasks in wartime conditions, when all peacetime radiation sources are disabled or turned off.

In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized omnidirectional covert noise radiation transmitters (100-200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of third-party illumination in a special period. This will allow, on the basis of the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime, to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system.

There are no analogues

The Rubezh complex is not an analogue of any of the known samples presented in the State Armaments Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) of cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite broadcasting and television transmitting centers. Therefore, the central task for "Kant" was the creation of receiving modules for signals reflected from targets of third-party illumination and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

The current state of the electronic component base, data transmission and synchronization systems makes it possible to create compact receiving modules with small overall dimensions. Such modules can be located on cellular towers, using the power lines of this system and not having any effect on its operation due to their insignificant power consumption.

Sufficiently high probabilistic characteristics of detection make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for establishing the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, the state border) by a low-altitude target, followed by the issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground-based or space-based means about the direction and boundary of the appearance of the intruder.

Thus, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a spacing between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an RCS of 1m2 in the “clear zone” with a correct detection probability of 0.7 and a false alarm probability of 10–4 . The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on the detection of low-altitude targets, conducted by OAO NPP Kant with the assistance of OAO RTI im. Academician A. L. Mints ”and the participation of employees of the VA VKO them. G. K. Zhukova. The test results confirmed the prospects for the use of low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of the BS of GSM cellular communication systems. When the receiving module was removed at a distance of 1.3–2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, a Yak-52 type target was confidently detected under various observation angles both in the front and rear hemispheres in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network makes it possible to build a flexible pre-field for monitoring low-altitude air and surface space in the field of illumination of the BS of the GSM communication network in the border zone.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines to a depth of 50-100 kilometers, along the front in a band of 200-300 kilometers and up to 1500 meters in height. Each detection line represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between the BSs. The detection zone is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental solution is based on the fact that when a target is detected through the light, its effective reflective surface increases many times, which makes it possible to detect low-profile targets made using the Stealth technology.

Increasing the capacity of aerospace defense

From line to line of detection, the number and direction of flying targets are clarified. In this case, the algorithmic (calculated) determination of the distance to the target and its height becomes possible. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined by the bandwidth of the information transmission channels over the lines of cellular communication networks.

Information from each detection zone is sent via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (CSOI), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. Targets are identified by direction-finding, frequency and time features, as well as when installing video recorders - by target images.

Thus, the Rubezh complex will allow:

• create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multi-frequency overlapping of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
• to provide the state border and other territories of the country, which are poorly equipped with traditional means of radar, with means of controlling the air and ground space (the lower limit of the controlled radar field of less than 300 meters is created only around the control centers major airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower border is determined only by the needs of escorting civilian aircraft along mainline airlines that do not fall below 5000 meters);
• significantly reduce the cost of placement and commissioning compared to any similar systems;
• solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation: MO (building up a low-altitude radar field on duty in threatened directions), FSO (in terms of ensuring the security of state protection facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor air terrorist threats or control the use of surface space ), ATC (control over the flights of light aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to the forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual growth of small general aviation aircraft is 20 percent annually), FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important objects and protection of state borders), Ministry of Emergency Situations (fire safety monitoring, search for crashed aircraft, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the tasks of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied to the RF Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

Reference Information:

Research and Production Enterprise "Kant" for more than 28 years has been developing, manufacturing and maintaining modern means of special communications and data transmission, radio monitoring and electronic warfare, information security systems and information channels. The products of the enterprise are used in the supply of almost all power structures of the Russian Federation and are used in solving defense and special tasks.

OJSC NPP Kant has a modern laboratory and production facilities, a highly professional team of scientists and engineering specialists, which allows it to perform full complex research and production tasks: from research and development, serial production to repair and maintenance of equipment in operation.

Authors: Andrey Demidyuk, Executive Director of OAO NPP Kant, Doctor of Military Sciences, Associate Professor Evgeny Demidyuk, Head of the Department of Innovative Development of JSC NPP Kant, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Associate Professor

This problem can be solved by affordable, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such facilities are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using the accompanying illumination of transmitters communication and broadcasting networks. Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem.

The task of creating and maintaining a continuous round-the-clock duty airspace control field at extremely low altitudes (LMA) is complex and costly. The reasons for this lie in the need to consolidate the orders of radar stations (RLS), the creation of an extensive communication network, the saturation of the surface space with sources of radio emissions and passive reflections, the complexity of ornithological and meteorological conditions, dense population, high intensity of use and inconsistency of legal acts relating to this area.

In addition, the boundaries of responsibility of various ministries and departments in the control of surface space are divided. All this greatly complicates the possibility of organizing radar monitoring of airspace in WWI.

Why do we need a continuous surface airspace monitoring field

For what purposes is it necessary to create a continuous field for monitoring surface airspace in WWI in peacetime? Who will be the main consumer of the information received?

The experience of working in this direction with various departments indicates that no one is against the creation of such a field, but each interested department needs (for various reasons) its own functional unit limited in goals, tasks and spatial characteristics.

The Ministry of Defense needs to control the airspace in WWI around defended objects or in certain directions. Border service - above the state border, and not higher than 10 meters from the ground. A unified air traffic management system - over airfields. Ministry of Internal Affairs - only aircraft preparing for takeoff or landing outside the permitted flight areas. FSB - the space around sensitive facilities.

Ministry of Emergency Situations - areas of man-made or natural disasters. FSO - areas of stay of protected persons.

This situation indicates the absence of a unified approach to solving the problems and threats that await us in the low-altitude surface environment.

In 2010, the problem of controlling the use of airspace in WWI was transferred from the responsibility of the state to the responsibility of the aircraft operators themselves.

In accordance with the current Federal rules for the use of airspace, a notification procedure for the use of airspace was established for flights in class G (small aviation) airspace. From now on, flights in this airspace class can be carried out without obtaining an air traffic control clearance.

If we consider this problem through the prism of the appearance of unmanned aerial vehicles in the air, and in the near future, passenger "flying motorcycles", then a whole range of tasks arises related to ensuring the safety of using airspace at extremely low altitudes above settlements, industrially hazardous areas.

Who will control traffic in low-altitude airspace?

Companies in many countries around the world are developing such affordable low-altitude vehicles. For example, the Russian company Aviaton plans to create its own passenger quadrocopter by 2020 for flights (attention!) outside airfields. That is, where it is not prohibited.

The reaction to this problem has already manifested itself in the form of the adoption by the State Duma of the law "On Amendments to the Air Code of the Russian Federation regarding the use of unmanned aircraft." In accordance with this law, all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) weighing more than 250 g are subject to registration.

In order to register a UAV, it is necessary to submit an application to the Federal Air Transport Agency in any form, indicating the details of the drone and its owner. However, judging by how things are going with the registration of manned light and ultralight aircraft, it seems that the problems with unmanned aircraft will be the same. Now, two different organizations are responsible for registering light (ultra-light) manned and unmanned aircraft, and no one is able to organize control over the rules for their use in class G airspace over the entire territory of the country. This situation contributes to an uncontrolled increase in cases of violations of the rules for the use of low-altitude airspace and, as a result, an increase in the threat of man-made disasters and terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, the creation and maintenance of a wide field of monitoring in WWI in peacetime by traditional means of low-altitude radar is hampered by the limitations of sanitary requirements for the electromagnetic load on the population and the compatibility of RES. Existing legislation strictly regulates the RES radiation regimes, especially in populated areas. This is strictly taken into account when designing new RES.

So, what's in the bottom line? The need for surface airspace monitoring in PMA objectively remains and will only increase.

However, the possibility of its implementation is limited by the high cost of creating and maintaining a field in WWI, the inconsistency of the legal framework, the lack of a single responsible body interested in a large-scale round-the-clock field, as well as restrictions imposed by supervisory organizations.

It is urgent to start developing preventive measures of an organizational, legal and technical nature aimed at creating a system for continuous monitoring of PMA airspace.

Max Height class G airspace boundaries vary up to 300 meters in the Rostov region and up to 4.5 thousand meters in areas Eastern Siberia. IN last years Russian civil aviation is witnessing an intensive growth in the number of registered facilities and operators of general aviation (GA). As of 2015, over 7,000 aircraft were registered in the State Register of Civil Aircraft of the Russian Federation. It should be noted that, in general, no more than 20-30% of the total number of aircraft (AC) of legal entities, public associations and private owners of aircraft using aircraft are registered in Russia. The remaining 70-80% fly without an air operator's license or without aircraft registration at all.

According to NP GLONASS estimates, sales of small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in Russia annually increase by 5-10%, and by 2025 2.5 million of them will be purchased in the Russian Federation. It is expected that the Russian market in terms of consumer and commercial small Civilian UAS can make up about 3-5% of the global.

Monitoring: economical, affordable, environmentally friendly

If we take an unbiased approach to the means of creating a continuous monitoring of the WWI in peacetime, then this problem can be solved by affordable, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such facilities are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using the accompanying illumination of transmitters of communication and broadcasting networks.

Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem. The SNS Research group published the report "Military & Civil Aviation Passive Radar Market: 20132023" (Military & Civil Aviation Passive Radar Market: 20132023) and expects that by 2023 the investment in both sectors in the development of technologies for such radars will reach more than 10 billion US dollars, with annual growth in the period 2013-2023. will be almost 36%.

The simplest version of a semi-active multi-position radar is a two-position (bistatic) radar, in which the backlight transmitter and the radar receiver are separated by a distance exceeding the range measurement error. A bistatic radar consists of a satellite illumination transmitter and a radar receiver separated by a base distance.

As an accompanying illumination, radiation from transmitters of communication and broadcasting stations, both ground-based and space-based, can be used. The backlight transmitter generates an omnidirectional low-altitude electromagnetic field, being in which targets

With a certain effective scattering surface (ESR), they reflect electromagnetic energy, including in the direction of the radar receiver. The receiver's antenna system receives a direct signal from the illumination source and an echo signal from the target, delayed relative to it.

In the presence of a directional reception antenna, the angular coordinates of the target and the total range relative to the radar receiver are measured.

The basis for the existence of PAL are extensive areas of coverage by broadcasting and communication signals. Thus, the zones of various cellular operators almost completely overlap, mutually complementing each other. In addition to the zones of cellular communication illumination, the territory of the country is covered by overlapping radiation fields of TV broadcast transmitters, VHF FM and FM satellite TV broadcasting stations, and so on.

To create a multi-position network of radar monitoring in the WWI, an extensive communication network is required. Dedicated secure APNs have such capabilities - packet data transmission channels based on M2M "telematics" technology. The typical bandwidth characteristics of such channels at peak load are no worse than 20 Kb / s, but according to the experience of application, they are almost always much higher.

JSC "SPE "KANT" is working on the study of the possibility of detecting targets in the field of illumination of cellular networks. In the course of research, it was found that the most extensive coverage of the territory of the Russian Federation is carried out by a communication signal of the GSM 900 standard. This communication standard provides not only sufficient energy for the illumination field, but also a technology for packet data transmission of GPRS wireless communication at a speed of up to 170 Kb / s between elements of a multi-position radar spaced at regional distances.

The work carried out as part of R&D showed that a typical out-of-town territorial-frequency planning of a cellular communication network makes it possible to build a low-altitude multi-position active-passive system for detecting and tracking ground and air (up to 500 meters) targets with an effective reflective surface of less than 1 sq. m.

The high suspension height of base stations on antenna towers (from 70 to 100 meters) and the network configuration of cellular communication systems make it possible to solve the problem of detecting low-altitude targets made using low-observable STELS technology using spaced location methods.

As part of R & D for the detection of air, ground and surface targets in the field of cellular networks, a detector of a passive receiving module (PRM) of a semi-active radar station was developed and tested.

As a result of field tests of the RPM model within the boundaries of the GSM 900 cellular communication network with a distance between base stations of 4-5 km and a radiation power of 30-40 W, the possibility of detecting a Yak-52 aircraft, a drone - a DJI Phantom 2 quadcopter , moving automobile and river transport as well as people.

During the tests, the spatial and energy characteristics of detection and the capabilities of the GSM signal to resolve targets were evaluated. The possibility of transmitting packet detection information and remote mapping of information from the test area to a remote observation indicator has been demonstrated.

Thus, in order to create a continuous round-the-clock multi-frequency overlapping field of location in the surface space at the PMA, it is necessary and possible to build a multi-position active-passive location system with the combination of information flows obtained using illumination sources of various wavelengths: from meter (analog TV, VHF FM and FM broadcast) to short decimeter (LTE, Wi-Fi). This requires the efforts of all organizations working in this direction. The necessary infrastructure and encouraging experimental data are available for this. We can safely say that the accumulated information base, technology and the very principle of hidden PAL will find their rightful place in wartime.

In the figure: "Scheme of a bistatic radar". For example, the current coverage area of ​​​​the borders of the Southern federal district signal of the mobile operator "Beeline"

To assess the scale of placement of backlight transmitters, let's take the average Tver region as an example. In it, on an area of ​​​​84 thousand square meters. km with a population of 1 million 471 thousand people, there are 43 broadcasting transmitters for broadcasting sound programs of VHF FM and FM stations with a radiation power of 0.1 to 4 kW; 92 analog transmitters of television stations with radiation power from 0.1 to 20 kW; 40 digital transmitters of television stations with power from 0.25 to 5 kW; 1,500 transmitting radio communication facilities of various affiliations (mainly cellular base stations) with a radiation power from a few mW in an urban area to several hundred W in a suburban area. The height of the illumination transmitters suspension varies from 50 to 270 meters.

BC/ NW 2015 № 2 (27): 13 . 2

AIRSPACE CONTROL THROUGH SPACE

Klimov F.N., Kochev M. Yu., Garkin E.V., Lunkov A.P.

High-precision air attack weapons, such as cruise missiles and unmanned attack aircraft, in the process of their development began to have a long range of 1,500 to 5,000 kilometers. The low visibility of such targets during the flight requires their detection and identification on the acceleration trajectory. It is possible to fix such a target at a long distance, either by over-the-horizon radar stations (OG radars), or using satellite-based radar or optical systems.

Attack drones and cruise missiles fly most often at speeds close to those of passenger aircraft, therefore, an attack by such means can be disguised as normal air traffic. This puts before the airspace control systems the task of detecting and identifying such means of attack from the moment of launch and at the maximum distance from the lines of effective destruction of them by means of VKS. To solve this problem, it is necessary to apply all existing and developed airspace control and surveillance systems, including over-the-horizon radars and satellite constellations.

The launch of a cruise missile or an attack unmanned aircraft can be carried out from the torpedo tube of a patrol boat, from the external suspension of the aircraft or from a launcher disguised as a standard sea container located on a civilian dry cargo ship, car trailer, railway platform. The satellites of the missile attack warning system already today record and track the coordinates of launches of unmanned aircraft or cruise missiles in the mountains and in the ocean using the engine torch in the acceleration section. Consequently, the satellites of the missile attack warning system need to monitor not only the territory of a potential enemy, but also the waters of the oceans and continents globally.

The placement of radar systems on satellites to control the aerospace space today is associated with technological and financial difficulties. But in modern conditions, such a new technology as broadcast automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) can be used to control the airspace via satellites. Information from commercial aircraft using the ADS-B system can be collected using satellites by placing on board receivers operating at ADS-B frequencies and repeaters of the received information to ground-based airspace control centers. Thus, it is possible to create a global field of electronic surveillance of the planet's airspace. Satellite constellations can become sources of flight information about aircraft in fairly large areas.

Airspace information coming from ADS-B system receivers located on satellites makes it possible to control aircraft over oceans and in terrain folds mountain ranges continents. This information will allow us to isolate the means of air attack from the flow of commercial aircraft with their subsequent identification.

ADS-B identification information on commercial aircraft coming through satellites will create an opportunity to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks and sabotage in our time. In addition, such information will make it possible to detect emergency aircraft and aviation accident sites in the ocean far from the coast.

Let us evaluate the possibility of using various satellite systems for receiving aircraft flight information using the ADS-B system and relaying this information to ground-based airspace control systems. Modern aircraft transmit flight information using the ADS-B system using on-board transponders with a power of 20 W at a frequency of 1090 MHz.

The ADS-B system operates at frequencies that freely penetrate the Earth's ionosphere. The transmitters of the ADS-B system located on board the aircraft have limited power, therefore, the receivers located on board the satellites must have sufficient sensitivity.

Using the energy calculation of the Samolet-Sputnik satellite communication line, we can estimate the maximum range at which the satellite can receive information from aircraft. The peculiarity of the satellite link used is the restrictions on the mass, dimensions and power consumption of both the onboard transponder of the aircraft and the onboard satellite transponder.

To determine the maximum range at which it is possible to receive messages by the ADS-B satellite, we will use the well-known equation for the line of satellite communication systems on the ground-satellite section:

Where

is the effective signal power at the transmitter output ;

is the effective signal power at the receiver input;

– transmitting antenna gain;

– slant range from the spacecraft to the receiving AP;

-wavelength on the line "DOWN"

waves on the "Down" line;

is the effective aperture area of ​​the transmitting antenna;

is the transmission coefficient of the waveguide path between the transmitter and the SC antenna;

– efficiency of the waveguide path between the receiver and the ES antenna;

Transforming the formula, we find the slant range at which the satellite can receive flight information:

d = .

We substitute in the formula the parameters corresponding to the standard onboard transponder and the receiving trunk of the satellite. As calculations show, the maximum transmission range on the aircraft-satellite link is 2256 km. Such a slant transmission range on the aircraft-to-satellite link is possible only when operating through low-orbit constellations of satellites. At the same time, we use standard aircraft equipment without complicating the requirements for commercial aircraft.

The ground station for receiving information has significantly smaller restrictions on weight and dimensions than the onboard equipment of satellites and aircraft. Such a station can be equipped with more sensitive receivers and high gain antennas. Therefore, the communication range on the satellite-to-ground link depends only on the conditions of the line of sight of the satellite.

Using data from the orbits of satellite constellations, we can estimate the maximum slant range of communication between a satellite and a ground receiving station using the formula:

,

where H is the height of the satellite orbit;

is the radius of the Earth's surface.

The results of calculations of the maximum slant range for points at different geographical latitudes are presented in Table 1.

		Orbcom	Iridium	Messenger	globalstar	Signal
Orbit height, km				1400	1414	1500
Earth radius north pole, km	6356,86	2994,51	3244,24	4445,13	4469,52	4617,42
Radius of the Earth Arctic Circle, km	6365,53	2996,45	3246,33	4447,86	4472,26	4620,24
Earth radius 80°, km	6360,56	2995,34	3245,13	4446,30	4470,69	4618,62
Radius of the Earth 70°, km	6364,15	2996,14	3245,99	4447,43	4471,82	4619,79
Earth radius 60°, km	6367,53	2996,90	3246,81	4448,49	4472,89	4620,89
Earth radius 50°, km	6370,57	2997,58	3247,54	4449,45	4473,85	4621,87
Earth radius 40°, km	6383,87	3000,55	3250,73	4453,63	4478,06	4626,19
Earth radius 30°, km	6375,34	2998,64	3248,68	4450,95	4475,36	4623,42
Earth radius 20°, km	6376,91	2998,99	3249,06	4451,44	4475,86	4623,93
Earth radius 10°, km	6377,87	2999,21	3249,29	4451,75	4476,16	4624,24
Earth radius equator, km	6378,2	2999,28	3249,37	4451,85	4476,26	4624,35

The maximum transmission range on the aircraft-to-satellite link is less than the maximum slant range on the satellite-to-ground link of the Orbkom, Iridium and Gonets satellite systems. The maximum data slant range is closest to the calculated maximum data transmission range for the Orbcom satellite system.

Calculations show that it is possible to create an airspace surveillance system using satellite relaying of ADS-B messages from aircraft to ground-based flight information processing centers. Such a surveillance system will increase the range of controlled space from a ground station to 4,500 kilometers without the use of inter-satellite communications, which will increase the airspace control area. By using inter-satellite communication channels, we will be able to control the airspace globally.

Fig. 1 "Airspace control using satellites"

Fig. 2 "Airspace control with inter-satellite communication"

The proposed method of airspace control allows:

Expand the coverage area of ​​the airspace control system, including the waters of the oceans and the territory of mountain ranges up to 4500 km from the receiving ground station;

When using an inter-satellite communication system, it is possible to control the airspace of the Earth globally;

Receive flight information from aircraft regardless of foreign airspace surveillance systems;

Select air objects tracked by the overhead radar according to the degree of their danger at the far detection lines.

Literature:

1. Fedosov E.A. "Half a century in aviation". M: Bustard, 2004.

2. “Satellite communications and broadcasting. Directory. Edited by L.Ya.Kantor. M: Radio and communication, 1988.

3. Andreev V.I. “Order of the Federal Air Transport Service of the Russian Federation dated October 14, 1999 No. No. 80 "On the creation and implementation of a system of broadcasting automatic dependent surveillance in the civil aviation of Russia."

4. Traskovsky A. "Moscow's aviation mission: the basic principle of safe management." "Aviapanorama". 2008. No. 4.