Aurora high speed train. “Memory seems to have erased this day”

September 4, 1851 near the Klin station, the first crash occurred on the St. Petersburg-Moscow railway.

A passenger train of two cars followed the correct (right) path to Moscow. A second passenger train was sent to meet him on the wrong track - the right track from Moscow was closed due to repairs. The drivers noticed each other too late, when the collision was no longer possible to prevent. The trains collided and the locomotives were badly damaged. Both drivers, one of their assistants and the train mechanic were killed.

The means of signaling and communication on the Nikolaev railway, as well as the traffic rules in difficult cases, were still in their infancy. There was no communication between neighboring stations, and this was one of the reasons for the crash.

The official opening of the movement between St. Petersburg and Moscow took place 2 months after this incident - on November 1, 1851.

August 16, 1988 at 18.25 on the stretch Berezaika - Poplavenets at a speed of 155 km / h, a high-speed passenger train No. 159 "Aurora" crashed on the Leningrad-Moscow route. In the crash, all 15 carriages of the train derailed. A fire broke out in the overturned dining car, which spread to other cars.

Because of the lack of roads, the rescuers arrived in the disaster area very late. As a result of the crash, more than 30 people died, about 180 were injured. Cause of the crash: gross violations committed during repair work. Roadmaster N. Gavrilov was sentenced to long term conclusions, a number of road service workers were fired.

Among the employees of the October Railway there was a version that supplemented the official one. In the cab of the electric locomotive driving the Aurora, there was an inspector - an instructor driver. The regular machinist of the Aurora saw that not everything was going well on the way, but decided to skip the dangerous section at speed. The instructor, seeing this, went behind him and jerked the crane handle to the emergency braking position. The braking of an almost 1000-ton mass, rushing at a speed of 155 km / h, led to the fact that the already weakened track could not stand it. This version was not reflected in the documents.

October 15, 1996 On the stretch Okulovka - Malaya Vishera (257 km), two teenagers, 18-year-old Oleg Filippov and 19-year-old Sergey Naumenko, were detained. They unscrewed the nuts on several rails and waited for the Aurora branded train, hoping that when the train fell down a slope, they would be able to grab the passengers' valuables. But an automatic alarm system reacted to the break in the electrical circuit, the driver slowed down and stopped in time. One of the cars, however, nevertheless derailed. The attackers were detained a few days later, and two years later each was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

June 27, 1997 shellless explosive device worked in the toilet of the 13th car of the Yunost train (Moscow - St. Petersburg) on ​​the Okulovka - Malaya Vishera section. 5 people were killed, 14 were injured. The investigation found that a non-shell explosive device worked when a possible terrorist - Gadzhi Magomed Khalilov - thrust it into a technological hatch in the car. Khalilov died, working out his connections did not give anything.

January 26, 2000 at 2 hours 54 minutes, a collision occurred on the Torbino - Mstinsky Bridge section while moving towards a false green light passenger train No. 612 under the control of the driver Ognev A. B. and the assistant driver Tokarev M. K., traveling at a speed of 109 km / h, with freight train No. 3414 ahead, traveling at a speed of 24 km / h.

As a result of the collision, an assistant driver died and the driver of passenger train No. 612 was injured, 14 passengers were injured, an electric locomotive and 2 cars in a passenger train and 4 cars in a freight train derailed. A complete break in traffic was 9 hours 50 minutes.

The investigation established that false readings of traffic lights became possible due to the unsatisfactory organization of commissioning work during the commissioning of new devices on the Oktyabrskaya railway. d.

November 11, 2002 four people were killed and several people were injured in an electric train accident at the Baltiysky railway station in St. Petersburg. The electric train left the depot for a run-in after repair. Due to malfunction brake system two carriages of the train left the tracks under the tented part of the station, where the passengers were.

August 13, 2007 at 21.43 on the stretch of Burga - Malaya Visheva of the Oktyabrskaya railway. e. while following train No. 166 "Nevsky Express", under the electric locomotive ChS200-004 (engineer Fedotov), ​​the railway track was blown up. As a result, the electric locomotive and all 12 wagons derailed. 60 people were injured.

November 27, 2009 at 21.34 on the 285th km of the Aleshinka - Uglovka section at a speed of 190 km / h, the train No. 166 "Nevsky Express" derailed from Moscow to Petersburg (14 cars) under the electric locomotive ChS200-10. Three wagons derailed. At the site of the descent, a funnel with a diameter of 1 meter was found. 27 people died. Traffic on the main course of the Oktyabrskaya railway was interrupted for more than 20 hours.

Has not run since 2010. Replaced by branded train.

Signature train "Aurora" began to move on June 12, 1963. between Moscow and Leningrad (Petersburg). In 2009, the branded Sapsan train came to replace the Aurora. A similar train on the same route is the Nevsky Express train. It has been operating since 2001. Between 1984-2009 the ER200 electric train ran.

The Aurora train made its first flight on ChS2-78 traction. The driver Sakharov led the management of the train. The duration of the trip was 5 hours 27 minutes. Since 1965, the flight has become even faster - 4 hours 59 minutes. Starting from the 70s, due to the increase in the number of cars, the travel time increased up to 7 hours. Thanks to the renewal of the locomotive fleet by the ChS6 train, the travel time was reduced to 5 hours 30 minutes. The high-speed electric locomotive ChS6 could move up to 15 wagons, with a maximum speed of 180 km/h.

A major accident of passenger train No. 159 "Aurora" of the Oktyabrskaya Railway occurred in the summer of 1988 at 18:25 on the Berezayka-Poplavets section.

A major reconstruction of the train "Aurora" took place at the beginning of 2003. 15 cars of train No. 159/160 were modernized in order to increase the level of comfort and convenience. Finnish and Russian specialists were involved in the development of the new train interior design.

Russian Railways in 2008 announced the inexpediency of the Aurora route. The meaning of the flight disappeared due to the commissioning of the high-speed highway linking Moscow and St. Petersburg. In this regard, flight number 159-160 was excluded from the schedule. In the spring of 2010, the Aurora flight ceased operations. At present, it is being completely replaced by the Sapsan high-speed train with the same number 159/160. He arrives at the terminal station in 4 hours. This is 30 minutes faster than the predecessor ER-200.V this moment the composition of the train "Aurora" is used as trains 217A / 267A / 268A. It transports people almost every day.

Timetable of the branded train "Aurora" (Moscow - St. Petersburg (Leningrad), St. Petersburg (Leningrad) - Moscow)

The composition of the branded train used to depart from Moscow 3 times a day. The composition arrived at St. Petersburg.

Moscow, Saint Petersburg

Saint Petersburg - Moscow

for today for tomorrow for another date

You left so tragically, by chance,
God's will or just fate
May the memory of the accidental victims
Trains will be carried on the ground ...

On August 16, 1988, at 18:25, on the first picket of the 308th kilometer of the Berezaika-Poplavenets section of the Bologovsky branch of the Oktyabrskaya Railway, at a speed of 155 km / h, a high-speed passenger train No. 159 "Aurora" crashed on the Leningrad-Moscow route. In the crash, all 15 carriages of the train derailed. A fire broke out in the overturned restaurant carriage, which spread to other carriages.
As a result of the crash, 31 people died, more than 100 received injuries of varying severity, 2.5 km of the contact network, 0.5 km of the railway track were damaged, 12 cars were damaged to the point of exclusion from the inventory, a complete interruption in the movement of trains was allowed on a section of more than 15 hours.
One of the factors that caused such a number of victims was the unsuccessful design of the passenger car seats - during heavy braking, they broke off the mounts and, together with the passengers, accumulated at the front end of the cabin. After this incident, "Aurora" began to go with compartment cars instead of seated ones, and only in the early 2000s was it again made up of aircraft-type seated cars, this time meeting the most stringent requirements.

The Aurora disaster is still in the memory of many railway workers. A high-speed train at that time was the beauty and pride of the road, an object of special attention. But the tragedy happened, and many factors led to it, not all of which are known so far.

The main fault, of course, is still the way. The official document says: “An analysis of the state of the track at km 306-308 testified to a continuous increase in the number and degree of malfunctions. A day before the crash, when checking by a track measuring car, deviations in the track maintenance by 306-308 km of IV and V degrees were established in terms of subsidence, distortions and track maintenance in the plan. Such deviations did not ensure traffic safety at the established speeds of 160 km / h and, in accordance with technical instructions, required speed limits on 306 kilometers to 60 km / h, on 307 - to 120 and 308 - to 25 km / h.
It should be noted that on the indicated kilometers of track there were a large number of loose terminal bolts in violation of clause 2.6.1 of the Technical Instructions for the arrangement, laying and maintenance of a seamless track, which states: "To ensure the required linear resistance, the normative pressing of the rail to the base in the fastening unit must be 19.6 kN. This norm for fasteners of the KB type corresponds to a torque of 120 Nm per nut of each bolt, provided that the threads of the bolts and nuts are lubricated. " For the construction of the track laid at km 307-308, the overhaul should be carried out in accordance with the current regulation on scheduled preventive repairs of the superstructure of the track after the passage of 500 million tons of gross, the average repair - after the passage of 280 million tons of gross and lifting - after the passage 150 million tons gross. This provision required a lifting or medium repair at least once every 5 years. During the eight-year period, with the passage of 534.4 million tons of gross, not a single type of track repair was carried out, which led to the loss of the bearing and draining capacity of the ballast layer, the appearance of subsidence, distortions and dilution of the ballast layer (splashes).
It was established that the senior road foreman (PDS) 2 hours before the passage of the passenger train No. 159 carried out the straightening of the track for 307 km using the VPR-1200 machine at a temperature of the rails exceeding the temperature of their fastening by 30C (permissible excess on the straight section is 20C). This is strictly prohibited in clause 4.2.1 of the Technical Instructions for the arrangement, laying and maintenance of a seamless track, since it leads to a weakening of the track stability and creates conditions for its curvature (ejection). The curvature of the track during the ejection is the appearance of an unevenness in the horizontal plane, equal to 0.36-0.45 m over a length of 10-12 m, which is an obstacle to the movement of trains.
At the place where VPR-1200 began work at the ninth picket at km 307, as a result of incorrect work technology, a track subsidence was formed (according to the testimony of the senior road foreman who performed the track work) with a depth of 10-15 mm and a length of 5 m, and the withdrawal of this retreat in the position of the rail track in longitudinal profile was up to 3% with an allowable 1% at a train speed of more than 120 km / h (paragraph 1.5 of the Instruction CPU / 4402). The senior road foreman estimated this drawdown "by eye". In fact, it was so large that it led to the self-uncoupling of the first car and the locomotive of train No. 159, which followed this kilometer of track at a speed of 155 km / h.
The height difference of the automatic couplers at the time of self-uncoupling turned out to be so large that the automatic coupler of the electric locomotive ChS6-017 near the first car damaged the support beam on which the transition platform rests. As a result of self-release and, consequently, breakage of the brake line, there was an emergency braking of the train. In this case, an additional longitudinal force appeared, transmitted to the track from the wheels of the rolling stock, which, in combination with temperature forces, led to the "ejection" of the weakened track at the end of the first picket of 308 km and the derailment of the cars, followed by a crash.
The high speed of passenger train No. 159 at the time of the crash was allowed due to the fact that the senior road foreman unreasonably, without troubleshooting, canceled the warning, according to which the speed was limited to 60 km / h. The warning, valid for km 308, was issued by the deputy head of the track measuring car; it could be canceled in accordance with paragraph 7.14 of the Instruction for ensuring the safety of train traffic during track work (TsP / 4402) only by the head of the track distance.

But not everything is so simple, and the road foreman Nikolai Gavrilov, who, after an investigation, was sentenced to a long term by the court, turned out to be just a switchman - the crash had to be attributed to someone. His superiors, who allowed such a situation with overhaul periods and the order of work, got off with only removal from their posts.
Moreover. In the cab of the electric locomotive driving the Aurora, there was an inspector - an instructor driver. The regular machinist of the Aurora saw that not everything was going well on the way, but in the current situation he made a difficult decision - to slip through the dangerous section at speed - so there was some chance to stay on the rails. But the instructor, seeing this, went behind him and jerked the crane handle to the emergency braking position.
The braking of an almost 1000-ton mass, rushing at a speed of 155 km / h, led to the fact that the already weakened track could not stand it, there was a release under the train. This version was not reflected in the documents, but the locomotive workers stubbornly adhere to it, although it is much easier to blame everything on the railway workers ...

A small monument was erected at the site of the disaster, a cross was erected. Every year, on August 16, both Aurora trains from Moscow and St. Petersburg have a five-minute stop at this place in their schedule. The train and locomotive crew lay wreaths at the monument to the passengers who died here...

Specify the itinerary and date. In response, we will find information from Russian Railways about the availability of tickets and their cost. Choose the appropriate train and place. Pay for the ticket using one of the suggested methods. Payment information will be instantly transferred to Russian Railways and your ticket will be issued.

How to return a purchased train ticket?

Can I pay for a ticket with a card? And is it safe?

Yes, sure. Payment is made through the payment gateway of the processing center Gateline.net. All data is transmitted over a secure channel.The Gateline.net gateway was developed in accordance with the requirements of the international PCI DSS security standard. The gateway software has successfully passed the version 3.1 audit.The Gateline.net system allows you to accept payments by Visa and MasterCard, including using 3D-Secure: Verified by Visa and MasterCard SecureCode.The Gateline.net payment form is optimized for various browsers and platforms, including mobile devices.Almost all railway agencies on the Internet work through this gateway.

What is an electronic ticket and electronic registration?

Buying an electronic ticket to the site is a modern and fast way to issue a travel document without the participation of a cashier or operator.When buying an electronic railway ticket, seats are redeemed immediately, at the time of payment.After paying for boarding the train, you either need to go electronic registration or print your ticket at the station.Electronic registration Not available for all orders. If registration is available, it can be completed by clicking on the appropriate button on our website. You will see this button immediately after payment. You will then need your original ID and a printout of your boarding pass to board the train. Some conductors do not require a printout, but it's better not to risk it.print e-ticket you can at any time before the train departure at the box office at the station or at the self-registration terminal. To do this, you need a 14-digit order code (you will receive it by SMS after payment) and the original ID.

You left so tragically, by chance,
God's will or just fate
May the memory of the accidental victims
Trains will be carried on the ground ...

On August 16, 1988, at 18:25, on the first picket of the 308th kilometer of the Berezaika-Poplavenets section of the Bologovsky branch of the Oktyabrskaya Railway, at a speed of 155 km / h, a high-speed passenger train No. 159 "Aurora" crashed on the Leningrad-Moscow route. In the crash, all 15 carriages of the train derailed. A fire broke out in the overturned restaurant carriage, which spread to other carriages.
As a result of the crash, 31 people died, more than 100 received injuries of varying severity, 2.5 km of the contact network, 0.5 km of the railway track were damaged, 12 cars were damaged to the point of exclusion from the inventory, a complete interruption in the movement of trains was allowed on a section of more than 15 hours.
One of the factors that caused such a number of victims was the unsuccessful design of the passenger car seats - during heavy braking, they broke off the mounts and, together with the passengers, accumulated at the front end of the cabin. After this incident, "Aurora" began to go with compartment cars instead of seated ones, and only in the early 2000s was it again made up of aircraft-type seated cars, this time meeting the most stringent requirements.

The Aurora disaster is still in the memory of many railway workers. A high-speed train at that time was the beauty and pride of the road, an object of special attention. But the tragedy happened, and many factors led to it, not all of which are known so far.

The main fault, of course, is still the way. The official document says: “An analysis of the state of the track at km 306-308 testified to a continuous increase in the number and degree of malfunctions. A day before the crash, when checking by a track measuring car, deviations in the track maintenance by 306-308 km of IV and V degrees were established in terms of subsidence, distortions and track maintenance in the plan. Such deviations did not ensure traffic safety at the established speeds of 160 km / h and, in accordance with technical instructions, required speed limits on 306 kilometers to 60 km / h, on 307 - to 120 and 308 - to 25 km / h.
It should be noted that on the indicated kilometers of track there were a large number of loose terminal bolts in violation of clause 2.6.1 of the Technical Instructions for the arrangement, laying and maintenance of a seamless track, which states: "To ensure the required linear resistance, the normative pressing of the rail to the base in the fastening unit must be 19.6 kN. This norm for fasteners of the KB type corresponds to a torque of 120 Nm per nut of each bolt, provided that the threads of the bolts and nuts are lubricated. " For the construction of the track laid at km 307-308, the overhaul should be carried out in accordance with the current regulation on scheduled preventive repairs of the superstructure of the track after the passage of 500 million tons of gross, the average repair - after the passage of 280 million tons of gross and lifting - after the passage 150 million tons gross. This provision required a lifting or medium repair at least once every 5 years. During the eight-year period, with the passage of 534.4 million tons of gross, not a single type of track repair was carried out, which led to the loss of the bearing and draining capacity of the ballast layer, the appearance of subsidence, distortions and dilution of the ballast layer (splashes).
It was established that the senior road foreman (PDS) 2 hours before the passage of the passenger train No. 159 carried out the straightening of the track for 307 km using the VPR-1200 machine at a temperature of the rails exceeding the temperature of their fastening by 30C (permissible excess on the straight section is 20C). This is strictly prohibited in clause 4.2.1 of the Technical Instructions for the arrangement, laying and maintenance of a seamless track, since it leads to a weakening of the track stability and creates conditions for its curvature (ejection). The curvature of the track during the ejection is the appearance of an unevenness in the horizontal plane, equal to 0.36-0.45 m over a length of 10-12 m, which is an obstacle to the movement of trains.
At the place where VPR-1200 began work at the ninth picket at km 307, as a result of incorrect work technology, a track subsidence was formed (according to the testimony of the senior road foreman who performed the track work) with a depth of 10-15 mm and a length of 5 m, and the withdrawal of this retreat in the position of the rail track in longitudinal profile was up to 3% with an allowable 1% at a train speed of more than 120 km / h (paragraph 1.5 of the Instruction CPU / 4402). The senior road foreman estimated this drawdown "by eye". In fact, it was so large that it led to the self-uncoupling of the first car and the locomotive of train No. 159, which followed this kilometer of track at a speed of 155 km / h.
The height difference of the automatic couplers at the time of self-uncoupling turned out to be so large that the automatic coupler of the electric locomotive ChS6-017 near the first car damaged the support beam on which the transition platform rests. As a result of self-release and, consequently, breakage of the brake line, there was an emergency braking of the train. In this case, an additional longitudinal force appeared, transmitted to the track from the wheels of the rolling stock, which, in combination with temperature forces, led to the "ejection" of the weakened track at the end of the first picket of 308 km and the derailment of the cars, followed by a crash.
The high speed of passenger train No. 159 at the time of the crash was allowed due to the fact that the senior road foreman unreasonably, without troubleshooting, canceled the warning, according to which the speed was limited to 60 km / h. The warning, valid for km 308, was issued by the deputy head of the track measuring car; it could be canceled in accordance with paragraph 7.14 of the Instruction for ensuring the safety of train traffic during track work (TsP / 4402) only by the head of the track distance.

But not everything is so simple, and the road foreman Nikolai Gavrilov, who, after an investigation, was sentenced to a long term by the court, turned out to be just a switchman - the crash had to be attributed to someone. His superiors, who allowed such a situation with overhaul periods and the order of work, got off with only removal from their posts.
Moreover. In the cab of the electric locomotive driving the Aurora, there was an inspector - an instructor driver. The regular machinist of the Aurora saw that not everything was going well on the way, but in the current situation he made a difficult decision - to slip through the dangerous section at speed - so there was some chance to stay on the rails. But the instructor, seeing this, went behind him and jerked the crane handle to the emergency braking position.
The braking of an almost 1000-ton mass, rushing at a speed of 155 km / h, led to the fact that the already weakened track could not stand it, there was a release under the train. This version was not reflected in the documents, but the locomotive workers stubbornly adhere to it, although it is much easier to blame everything on the railway workers ...

A small monument was erected at the site of the disaster, a cross was erected. Every year, on August 16, both Aurora trains from Moscow and St. Petersburg have a five-minute stop at this place in their schedule. The train and locomotive crew lay wreaths at the monument to the passengers who died here...

Crash site.

High-speed train "Aurora" on the ill-fated stage.


New wagons "Aurora".

Berezaika station.

Monument. A large number of flowers is explained by the fact that just a week ago it was the 20th anniversary of the tragedy ...

Cross.

View from the paths.

Fast train No. 258 Moscow-Murmansk. On the supports of the contact network near the monument there is a sign "signal" - the drivers of passing trains give a short whistle ...

Another speed runner is the famous Nevsky Express (166/165).

He is rapidly moving towards St. Petersburg. It's time for us too - on the last train to Bologoye ...